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ABSTRACT
A large literature has been concerned with the impacts of recent welfare reforms on income,
earnings,  transfers,  and  labor-force  attachment.  While  one  strand  of  this  literature  relies  on
observational studies conducted with large survey-sample data sets, a second makes use of data
generated by experimental evaluations of changes to means-tested programs. Much of the overall
literature has focused on mean impacts. In this paper, we use random-assignment experimental data
from Canada's Self-Sufficiency Project (SSP) to look at impacts of this unique reform on the
distributions of income, earnings, and transfers. SSP offered members of the treatment group a
generous subsidy for working full time. Quantile treatment effect (QTE) estimates show there was
considerable heterogeneity in the impacts of SSP on the distributions of earnings, transfers, and total
income; heterogeneity that would be missed by looking only at average treatment effects. Moreover,
these heterogeneous impacts are consistent with the predictions of labor supply theory. During the
period when the subsidy is available, the SSP impact on the earnings distribution is zero for the
bottom half of the distribution. The SSP earnings distribution is higher for much of the upper third
of the distribution except at the very top, where the earnings distribution is the same under either
program or possibly lower under SSP. Further, during the period when SSP receipt was possible, the
impacts on the distributions of transfer payments (IA plus the subsidy) and total income (earnings
plus transfers) are also different at different points of the distribution. In particular, positive impacts
on the transfer distribution are concentrated at the lower end of the transfer distribution while
positive impacts on the income distribution are concentrated in the upper end of the income
distribution. Impacts of SSP on these distributions were essentially zero after the subsidy was no
longer available.
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As we move into the 21st century, government assistance for poor families has undergone 
major reform across Europe, Canada and the United States. In some cases, changes have taken 
place within traditional government welfare programs (e.g., the SSP demonstration in Canada 
and welfare reform in the United States) to reduce the negative work incentives embodied in 
programs that taxed away welfare benefits at a high rate with each extra dollar in earnings. In 
other cases, new programs have been added or expanded providing in-work subsidies for low 
income workers and families. Prominent examples of these policies are the United States’ Earned 
Income Tax Credit and the United Kingdom’s Working Family Tax Credit. Further, a recent 
report identifies nine OECD countries (including the United States and United Kingdom) that 
offer in-work subsidies (Owens 2005). A common feature of these program changes is 
expanding the financial gains to working. In so doing, the goal of the policy changes is to ‘make 
work pay’ and increase self sufficiency. 
In this dynamic policy environment, a large literature has developed.
1 A common feature 
of this literature is the focus on the mean impacts of the policy of interest. In this paper, we make 
an important contribution to the literature by using a simple nonparametric estimator — quantile 
treatment effects, or QTEs — to estimate the impact of an important policy change on the 
distribution of earnings and income outcomes.   
Many governments have conducted randomized experiments to assess the impacts of 
generous financial incentives for work on welfare and employment among cash assistance 
recipients. One such experiment, the Self-Sufficiency Project (SSP), has received an enormous 
                                                 
1 For example, in the United States, Grogger & Karoly (2005) provide a summary of welfare reform and Hotz & 
Scholz (2003) and Eissa & Hoynes (Forthcoming) provide reviews of the Earned Income Tax Credit. Blundell & 
Hoynes (2004) compare the United States’ and United Kingdom’s in-work policies, and evaluations of the Working 
Family Tax Credit appear in Blundell et al., (2005), Brewer et al., (2005), Francesconi & van der Klauw (2004), 
Gregg & Harkness (2003), and Leigh (2004). Bargain & Orsini (2004) and Smith et al., (2003) use cross-country 
data to evaluate European reforms.   2
amount of attention due to its ability to increase earnings and income. For example, findings 
about SSP were cited in numerous U.K. government documents as inspiration for reforms 
instituted by the Labour government in the late 1990s. SSP was sponsored by Human Resources 
Development Canada and conducted by the Social Research Demonstration Corporation. SSP 
was designed to test the impact of a generous earnings subsidy for full-time work on long-term 
welfare participants.  
Between 1992 and 1995, SSP randomly assigned a group of single-parent recipients and 
applicants for income assistance (IA) in two provinces, New Brunswick and British Columbia, to 
treatment and control groups. Control group members faced the rules of IA in their home 
province. Treatment group members who had been on IA for 12 of the previous 13 months were 
eligible for a generous earnings supplement if they could find full time work (at least 30 hours a 
week) at or above the minimum wage within a year. The earnings supplement was one-half the 
difference between their earnings and a benchmark earnings level ($30,000 in New Brunswick 
and $37,000 in British Columbia) and was available for 36 months. Persons receiving the 
supplement had to forego their IA payments, although if they gave up the supplement, they could 
receive IA if they were otherwise eligible.  
Several final reports (Michalopoulos et al., 2002 and Ford et al., 2003), and a large 
number of research papers (e.g., Blank et al. , 2000; Card & Hyslop, 2004; Card et al., 2001; 
Connolly & Gottschalk, 2003; Foley, 2004; Foley & Schwartz 2002; Harknett & Gennetian, 
2003; Kamionka & Lacroix, 2003; Lise et al., 2005; Michalopoulos et al., 2005; Zabel et al., 
2004) have looked at the overall impacts of the SSP experiment on income, earnings, labor force 
attachment, unemployment durations, wages, wage growth, job choice, and marriage. These 
papers find that the program increased employment, earnings, and income considerably during   3
the years when the supplement was available, while having little or no impacts after the 
supplement was no longer available.  
Existing literature focuses on SSP’s mean impacts, in the full sample and in demographic 
subgroups. Mean impacts, however, may conceal heterogeneous impacts across the distribution 
of earnings and income. For example, SSP generates an increase in total income and net wages at 
30 hours of work and above. The income gains are substantial — most families had after-tax 
annual incomes $3,000–$7,000 higher with SSP than they would have had if they had worked 
the same number of hours under IA (Michalopoulos et al., 2002). Static labor supply theory 
predicts that this increase in nonlabor income would lead some recipients to increase work and 
leave IA, thereby increasing earnings and income. On the other hand, workers who would work 
full-time under IA-only assignment receive a windfall payment under SSP, which could lead to 
much smaller (and possibly negative) earnings effects based on standard labor supply analysis.  
In this paper, we move beyond mean impacts and examine the impacts of SSP on the 
distribution of earnings, transfers, and income using QTE estimation.
2 We estimate the QTEs 
very simply as the difference in outcomes at various quantiles of the treatment (SSP) and control 
(IA-only) group distributions. Thus, QTEs tell us how the earnings distribution changes when we 
assign SSP treatment randomly. The QTE is a simple nonparametric estimator that requires only 
that the treatment is randomly assigned. As we discuss in more detail below, QTEs identify only 
the impact of treatment on the distribution; this impact is distinct from, and in general not equal 
to, the distribution of treatment effects (as well as other interesting estimates, such as the 
treatment effect on people whose control-group outcome would have been the median, etc.).  
                                                 
2 A host of authors have used QTEs (e.g., Heckman, Smith, & Clements, 1997; Firpo, 2004).  Friedlander & Robins 
(1997) estimate QTEs to evaluate the impact of employment training programs in early welfare-reform experiments.  
Bitler, Gelbach, & Hoynes (Forthcoming) examine the impact of a welfare-reform experiment in Connecticut in the 
mid-1990s on AFDC and Food Stamp payments, earnings, and total income.   4
In this paper, we contribute to the literature on the impacts of financial incentives on 
labor supply and to the existing experimental literature including our own earlier work (Bitler et 
al., Forthcoming) in three ways. First, SSP is an important policy that has received a great deal of 
attention in the international policy arena, influencing adoption of new policies and experiments 
in Europe. The minimum work requirement and relatively generous benefits make the policy 
unique and have important implications for the impacts of the policy. For example, SSP moved 
long term recipients into the labor force much more quickly than they would have under Income 
Assistance while nearly paying for itself, costing a scant $4000 more per recipient over a 5-year 
period than Income Assistance (Michalopoulos et al., 2002).  Our distributional analysis adds to 
our understanding of SSP in a fundamental way.
3 Second, the SSP experiment is unusual in that 
it provides data on wages and hours thereby allowing for a much richer analysis of the labor 
supply implications relative to our earlier work (Bitler et al., Forthcoming).  Finally, to our 
knowledge we are the first to explore empirically the validity of the rank preservation 
assumption — that is the assumption that one’s spot in the distribution of income (or earnings or 
transfers) is invariant to program assignment. If rank preservation holds, then the QTEs we 
present are identical to the distribution of treatment effects, and can be used to assess how 
individuals at various points in a distribution are affected by the program. Understanding the 
extent to which people move across the distribution is important for interpretation of the results. 
  Our results show that the SSP program indeed had heterogeneous impacts across the 
earnings, transfer, and income distributions. During the period when the subsidy is available, the 
impact of SSP on the earnings distribution is zero for the bottom half of the distribution. The SSP 
                                                 
3 Michalopoulos et al. (2002, 2005) examine the impact of SSP on poverty rates and on ranges of hours worked and 
hourly wage rates.  While this provides some insight into the distributional analysis, our analysis is more 
comprehensive in that it also analyzes impacts on earnings, income, and transfers.  We also examine the full 54 
month follow-up period rather than analyzing data from a few months, making our results more representative of the 
longer run impacts of SSP.  Finally, their analyses focus on wages among the employed. By contrast, we consider 
the distribution of wages for everyone, which takes account of the changes in employment rates and allows for more 
clean interpretation of the results.   5
earnings distribution is higher for much of the upper third of the distribution except at the very 
top, where the earnings distribution is the same under either program or possibly lower under 
SSP. Further, during the SSP receipt period, the impacts on the distributions of transfer payments 
(IA plus the subsidy) and total income (earnings plus transfers) are also different at different 
points of these distributions. Positive impacts on the transfer distribution are concentrated at the 
lower end of the transfer distribution. By contrast, positive impacts on the income distribution 
are concentrated at the upper end of the income distribution, suggesting that within this group of 
long term welfare recipients, the program benefited the top of the distribution more than the 
bottom.
4 Impacts of SSP on these distributions were essentially zero or negative after the subsidy 
was no longer available.
5 
We argue that these findings are consistent with labor supply theory — workers respond 
to the financial incentives by changing their hours worked and, in some cases, reducing the 
reservation wages at which they will just be willing to take a job. We can explore these pathways 
more convincingly in this setting because we have data on wages and hours.  
Finally, our tests of rank preservation suggest that there is some evidence of rank reversal 
(along observable dimensions).  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we discuss the SSP 
experiment and the financial incentives in IA and SSP. In Section III, we use theoretical 
predictions about labor supply to discuss the expected effects of SSP on labor supply, welfare 
receipt, and income. Section IV discusses the empirical methods and Section V describes our 
data and presents descriptive statistics and reviews the mean treatment effects. Our main QTE 
                                                 
4 As we discuss below, a person whose transfer payments are at the bottom of the transfers distribution will not 
necessarily have income at the bottom of the income distribution (in fact, we would typically expect the opposite to 
be true). 
5 Note that persons assigned to the supplement group could always obtain Income Assistance (indefinitely) if they 
were income eligible and not receiving the supplement. This suggests that we might not see large “losers” in the 
supplement group as IA provided a safety net. This is in contrast to the findings for welfare recipients facing time 
limits in the post-TANF policy setting in the U.S. (Bitler et al., Forthcoming).   6
results are presented in Section VI. We explore the validity of the rank preservation assumption 
in Section VII and we conclude in Section VIII.  
 
II. SSP, Income Assistance, and the SSP Experiment 
The SSP experiment randomly assigned welfare recipients to a treatment group — who 
could obtain SSP — or a control group — who had access only to the existing Income 
Assistance (IA) program. In this paper, we use data from the SSP Recipient sample which 
consists of about 6,000 single parents aged 19 or older in British Columbia and New Brunswick 
who had been on IA for at least 12 month of the last 13 months.
6 Random assignment began in 
November 1992 and ended in March 1995. We begin by describing the financial incentives in IA 
and SSP. This will provide background for discussing the expected impact of SSP, which we 
cover in the next section.  
Income assistance was (at the time of the SSP experiment) Canada’s universal cash safety 
net program.
7 The program covers all demographic groups and, in particular, is available to 
families without children as well as those with children. Benefits are means tested using income 
and asset tests, and eligibility thresholds and benefit levels vary by province and family size. The 
IA benefit structure is typical of means-tested transfer programs and is characterized by a 
guaranteed income (the benefit received if the family has no other income) and a benefit 
reduction rate or phase-out rate which dictates how the benefit is reduced as earned income 
increases. The IA program is quite generous — in 1992 the annual guarantee for a single-parent 
family with one child was $13,752 in British Columbia and $8,964 in New Brunswick. As is 
                                                 
6 We exclude the SSP Plus sample (293 observations) from our analysis because we wish to focus on the impact of 
the financial incentives in SSP alone, which may be confounded with the effects of the employment services also 
offered in SSP Plus (e.g., Michalopoulos et al., 2002). We also ignore the SSP Applicant sample, made up of new 
applicants at the time of random assignment, who had to stay on welfare for 12 months to become eligible for the 
supplement. 
7 Information about IA is drawn from Barrett, Doiron, Green, & Riddell, 1996; Michalopoulos et al., 2002; and Ford 
et al., 2003.   7
common with welfare programs, the long-run benefit reduction rate was very high, leading to 
large work disincentives. Specifically, in 1992, IA recipients in New Brunswick faced a 100 per 
cent benefit reduction rate for every dollar earned over $200 per month. In British Columbia, the 
disregard was also $200 a month while the benefit reduction rate was 75 per cent for 12 out of 
each 36 months and 100 per cent for the other 24 months out of 36.
8 
The SSP earnings supplement is a negative-income-tax style transfer payment with a 
minimum hours of work restriction. In particular, to be eligible for a supplement payment, one 
had to work full-time (an average of at least 30 hours a week over a four-week period) at one or 
more jobs paying at least the minimum wage. During the experimental period, the minimum 
wage in British Columbia started at $5.50 an hour and increased to $7.15 in 1998 and the 
minimum wage in New Brunswick ranged from $5.00 an hour at the beginning of the period to 
$5.50 in 1996. Supplement recipients could not receive IA at the same time as they received the 
supplement, but supplement recipients could return to IA at any time (if income and otherwise 
eligible) and could also rejoin the supplement group if they met the hours and wage restrictions 
while the supplement was available. The ongoing IA eligibility suggests that members of the 
treatment group had a safety net if they could not find work. Lastly, to target the program to 
long-term welfare recipients, eligibility for the supplement required having been on IA for 12 of 
the past 13 months.  
The supplement is equal to one-half the difference between recipient earnings and a 
benchmark earnings amount (unearned income was not considered when calculating the 
                                                 
8 In September 1995, New Brunswick increased the earnings disregard for the first 12 months on aid to a flat amount 
of $200 or a 35 per cent disregard (whichever was larger) for 6 months and then $200 or 30 per cent for 6 months.   
In April 1996, the flat disregard of $200 per month was eliminated in British Columbia. In 1996, federal funding for 
IA was reduced and converted to a block grant.  Some provinces — including British Columbia — responded by 
reducing benefit levels or tightening eligibility requirements.  In 1996, British Columbia established sanctions for 
anyone who quit a job without just cause, barring IA eligibility for 6 months.  Later in 1996, British Columbia made 
its eligibility determination process more stringent. In addition, in 1996, British Columbia created a “Family Bonus” 
of $103 per child (for all low-income families with children), and reduced IA benefits by the same amount.  New 
Brunswick introduced a similar Child Tax Benefit, but it was much smaller (up to $250 per child per year).   8
supplement payment). At the beginning of the experiment, the benchmark was $37,000 in British 
Columbia and $30,000 in New Brunswick.
9 This benefit structure is equivalent to a guaranteed 
income which begins at an earnings level of the minimum hours point times the minimum wage 
and is then phased out using a 50 per cent benefit reduction rate with a breakeven point equal to 
the earnings benchmark. SSP represented a substantial increase in the financial incentives for 
work compared to the incentives in the IA program.  
The SSP experiment gave recipients 12 months to establish full-time work and take up 
the supplement. If recipients did not take-up the supplement within 12 months, they were 
ineligible to obtain it at all. Employers were not informed of supplement receipt by the provinces 
and program participants had to mail in pay-stubs to obtain supplement payments. Takers could 
receive the supplement for up to three years from the time when it started. Importantly, they 
could not bank the supplement for later use.  
 
III. Expected Impacts of the SSP Supplement 
To motivate our interest in measuring the impact of SSP on the distribution of earnings 
and income, it is useful to outline the incentives facing welfare recipients in the SSP and IA 
groups. We should note that this section describes incentives for individuals and does not, 
therefore, map directly into our QTE measures of impacts of SSP on the distributions.  
We examine potentially heterogeneous impacts of SSP on earnings, transfers, and income 
through two channels. We begin with a static labor supply model where women can freely 
choose hours of work at the given offered wage and offered wages are constant.
 (Note that we 
use women to refer to persons in the experiment for expediency: 96 per cent of those in our final 
                                                 
9 The earnings benchmarks were adjusted each year for inflation.  For more on the annual earnings benchmarks see 
Michalopoulos et al., (2002).   9
sample were females.) We then discuss the expected impacts on wages using the dynamic search 
model in Card & Hyslop (2004).  
To guide the discussion, Figure 1 presents a stylized budget constraint for IA and SSP. 
The figure plots hours of work on the horizontal axis and income (from IA/SSP and earnings) on 
the vertical axis. The IA portion of the budget set goes from hours of 0 to H1 (the IA breakeven 
point): if the woman does not work, she gets the maximum IA benefit. Then, for each additional 
dollar in earnings, the IA benefit is reduced by one dollar resulting in a slope of 0 for the IA 
budget constraint.
10 If assigned to the SSP group, a woman is eligible for SSP if she works 
beyond the hours restriction labeled H* in Figure 1. At H*, income increases by the SSP 
supplement, which is equal to one-half of the difference between earnings and the benchmark 
earnings amount, labeled E2. Therefore, the slope of the SSP portion of the budget set is one-half 
of the hourly wage w. In this stylized figure, the minimum hours restriction is set below the IA 
breakeven point (H*< H1). This may not be the case for all families — those with higher wages 
may have H*>H1.
11 
We begin by considering the static labor supply model with constant wages. The idea is 
to compare the labor supply incentives for someone facing IA-only to the counterfactual state of 
the world in which she is assigned to SSP. Consider the case in which a woman would choose 
not to work when assigned to IA only. Depending on her preferences, assignment to SSP may 
lead her to enter the labor market and work hours H, where H2>H>H*. Alternatively, she may 
continue to work zero hours and receive the maximum IA payment. The same qualitative 
predictions hold for a woman who, when assigned to IA only, chooses to receive IA and work 
below the hours restriction H*.  
                                                 
10 This stylized budget constraint captures neither the flat earnings disregards in IA nor the lower than 100 per cent 
tax rate that held in some periods.  These features do not alter the qualitative statements that we make here. 
11 In addition, the stylized budget constraint shows that the SSP payment at H* is larger than the IA guarantee which 
is true for (at least) minimum-wage workers. In general, the maximum SSP payment is inversely related to the wage.   10
We next consider a woman who, when assigned to the IA-only group, eventually leaves 
IA and works at hours levels above H1. In the counterfactual assignment to SSP, she finds 
herself in the “windfall” group where she is eligible for SSP and gains income without any 
change in behavior. Ashenfelter (1983) referred to this as a “mechanical” induced eligibility 
effect.   This effect leads to an ambiguous impact on hours worked depending on whether or not 
the 30 hour per week requirement (H*) is above or below the IA breakeven point (H1). SSP 
leads to an increase in nonlabor income and a decrease in the net wage, both of which lead to a 
decrease in desired hours. However, if H* is above H1 (not as drawn in Figure 1), it is possible 
that to obtain the SSP supplement, the woman may need to increase her hours.  Importantly, for 
the vast bulk of women in this group, we do not expect the increase in desired hours that is 
experienced by the nonworking group discussed above.  We instead expect hours to decrease for 
the bulk of the women.  Lastly, consider a woman who might have eventually left IA and worked 
at a high level, say H>H2 (yielding income too high for SSP eligibility). She may be induced to 
decrease her hours, compared to her counterfactual choice under IA only, to become eligible for 
SSP. Ashenfelter (1983) refers to this group as having a “behavioral” induced eligibility effect.
12  
Now consider the impact of SSP in the context of a dynamic search model. Card & 
Hyslop (2004) outline such a model and find that SSP should induce women to search more 
intensely; they might also accept jobs with lower reservation wages than they would under 
counterfactual IA in order to become eligible for the supplement. Further, Card & Hyslop (2004) 
find that a woman’s reservation wage decreases as she approaches the one-year time limit for 
establishing eligibility for SSP. These results need not imply that wages will decrease throughout 
the distribution, however. SSP requires work at the minimum wage or higher — so lower-skill 
                                                 
12 During months 1–54, only 1.8 per cent of the British Columbia control sample, and 1.8 per cent of the New 
Brunswick control sample had monthly earnings that would make them ineligible for SSP (under random-
assignment eligibility levels), suggesting that a small share of the overall distribution might face such a behavioral 
induced eligibility effect.   11
women are unable to reduce their reservation wage below the minimum. Consequently, the 
reduction in wages will be concentrated at upper end of the wage distribution.  
In sum, the expected impacts on earnings are heterogeneous and may be negative, zero, 
or positive. The static labor supply model predicts no change in earnings at the bottom of the 
distribution, an increase in earnings in the middle of the distribution, with little change (and 
possibly a reduction) in earning at the top of the distribution. There might also be reductions 
somewhat below the top of the earnings distribution, if income effects dominate for those women 
who would not receive IA when assigned to the control group but would be income-eligible for 
SSP holding constant their behavior. Further, the dynamic search model implies that earnings 
may decrease due to a reduction in reservation wages, and this is also likely to be concentrated at 
the top of the earnings distribution (if high-wage individuals are also high-earnings individuals). 
Therefore we can assess the contribution of these two channels — hours and wages — to the 
changes in earnings.  
This discussion can also be extended to consider impacts of SSP on transfer income (IA 
plus SSP if eligible) and total income. The increase in transfers is likely to be concentrated at the 
bottom of the transfer distribution (among those with lower welfare use) with small or no gains 
at the top of the transfer distribution. The impact on the distribution of income depends on the 
relative change in earnings and transfers but is likely to be zero at the bottom of the distribution 
(where women stay on IA) and higher at the top of the distribution (where high-skill women get 
the windfall of SSP).  
 
IV. QTE Methodology  
The evaluation reports present mean differences between treatments and controls for 
employment, income, wages, transfers, and children’s outcomes at each of the follow-up surveys   12
(e.g., Michalopoulos et al., 2002). Given random assignment to the program, these mean 
differences are reliable estimates of the true mean impact of the program. The above discussion 
of the impacts of SSP suggest that mean impacts may conceal heterogeneous impacts across the 
distribution. Here we outline the quantile treatment effect (QTE) estimator that we use to 
examine the impact of SSP on the entire distribution of earnings (and transfer payments and total 
income).  
The QTE for quantile q may be estimated very simply as the difference across treatment 
status in the quantiles of outcomes for the two groups (treatments and controls). To understand 
QTE, imagine that we take a large group of people — say, N=N1+N0 in number — and 
randomly assign N1 of them to SSP and N0 of them to IA. For concreteness, suppose we are 
interested in the effect of SSP on the 25
th quantile of the earnings distribution. The 25
th quantile 
of the SSP group's earnings distribution is the smallest level of earnings such that at least 25 per 
cent of SSP-assigned people have earnings below that level. Similarly, the 25
th quantile of the IA 
group's earnings distribution is the smallest level of earnings such that at least 25 per cent of IA-
assigned people have earnings below that level. The QTE at the 25
th quantile is the difference in 
these two earnings levels. Thus, QTEs tell us how the earnings distribution changes when we 
assign SSP treatment randomly. Other quantile treatment effects are estimated analogously, and 
we evaluate the distributions at 99 centiles.  
One important methodological distinction is between quantile treatment effects and 
quantiles or other features of the treatment effect distribution. To understand the distinction, it 
will be helpful to briefly introduce a model of causal effects. Let Ti=1 if observation i receives 
the treatment, and 0 otherwise. Let Yi(t) be i's counterfactual value of the outcome Y if i has Ti=t. 
The fundamental evaluation problem is that for any i, at most one element of the pair (Yi(0),   13
Yi(1)) can ever be observed: we cannot observe someone who is simultaneously treated and not 
treated.  
Evaluation methodology focuses on inferences concerning various features of the joint 
distribution of (Y(0),Y(1)). In particular, the marginal distributions F0(y) and F1(y) are always 
identified, where Ft(y)= Pr[Yi(t)< y] for a randomly drawn i. There is an enormous literature 
concerning this model and the assumptions under which it is useful. See, for example, papers by 
Heckman et al., (1997) or Imbens & Angrist (1994) for further details.  
Quantile treatment effects are features of the marginal distributions F0(y) and F1(y). For 
treatment assignment t, the qth quantile of distribution Ft is defined as yq(t) ≡ inf{y:Ft(y)≥q}. The 
quantile treatment effect for quantile q is then simply the difference in the two qth quantiles of 
the two distributions: 
Δq = yq(1) - yq(0).  
Our above example concerning the QTE for the 25
th quantile involves setting q=0. 25. Thus the 
estimated quantile treatment effect is the simple difference between quantiles of the distribution 
for the treatment and control groups 
   By contrast, for observation i, the treatment effect is δi= Yi(1)-Yi(0), and the cumulative 
distribution of treatment effects may be written as G(d)= Pr[δi ≤ d] for randomly chosen i. Thus, 
unlike quantile treatment effects, quantiles of the distribution of treatment effects cannot be 
written as features of the marginal distributions. Rather, they require more detailed knowledge of 
the joint distribution (e.g., further assumptions about it).  
Under some conditions, the distribution of treatment effects is recoverable from the 
quantile treatment effects. For example, if the treatment effect is equal for all observations then 
the distribution G is degenerate and is fully identified by the mean impact. However, the above 
discussion of labor supply impacts suggests that such a homogeneity restriction is not valid here.   14
Second, if people’s ranks in the distributions are the same regardless of whether they are 
assigned to treatment or control group (e.g., there is rank preservation across treatment status), 
then the QTE at quantile q tells us the treatment effect for the person located at quantile q in the 
given distribution. Under rank preservation, all features of the distribution of treatment effects 
that can be associated with an observed characteristic are identified. Rank preservation is a 
strong assumption and will fail here if, for example, preferences for work do not map one-to-one 
with rank in the distribution.  
In this project we present estimates of the QTE. We do not rely on the rank preservation 
assumption (although in section VII, we explore empirically the validity of this assumption). We 
fully recognize that this approach does not identify the distribution of treatment effects, nor does 
it identify the impact for people at given quantiles. In particular, the discussion of the expected 
effects of SSP above relies on an individual model of behavior that we cannot, in general, fully 
identify with only the QTEs. Instead, our method identifies the impact of the SSP treatment on 
the distributions of earnings, transfers, and income. Identifying these effects does allow one to 
examine some important issues — for example, how SSP affects the lower end of the earnings 
distribution compared to its effects on the higher end of the distribution. This knowledge can be 
very important in policy evaluation — where the distributions of outcomes in two different 
regimes are compared and social welfare calculations are applied. The advantage of our approach 
is that it is fully nonparametric and we require no further assumptions beyond random 
assignment of the treatment. In fact, this is the natural analog to estimating mean impacts in 
experimental studies by simply differencing means for the treatment and control groups.  
As we will show below in Table 1, the SSP treatment and control samples are well 
balanced and there are few statistical differences in the observables in the two groups. 
Accordingly, we present simple QTEs and do not adjust for any covariates. Were there clearly   15
significant differences in baseline characteristics between the two groups, we could appropriately 
adjust for them by using inverse propensity score weighting, as implemented in Bitler et al., 
(Forthcoming), and formally discussed in Firpo (2004) and Wooldridge (2003).  
 
V. Data, Descriptive Statistics and Mean Impacts  
We use data made available by SRDC to outside researchers upon completion of an 
application process. SRDC obtained administrative data on IA participation and payment 
amounts from provincial records covering a period of up to 4 years before random assignment 
and as many as 95 months after. The experiment tracked SSP participation and supplement 
payment data. Information on monthly employment, earnings, usual hours, usual weeks, wages, 
and other outcomes come from retrospective surveys conducted at baseline, and at 18, 36, and 54 
months after random assignment. This is one distinction between the SSP experiment and many 
U.S. experiments, where earnings data come from administrative records of the Unemployment 
Insurance system rather than self reports, while wages and hours are generally unavailable.  
Demographic data — including information on the sample members’ number of children, 
educational attainment, age, race and ethnicity, language, nativity, marital status, and work 
history — were collected at the baseline interview.  
The full Recipient sample (excluding the 293 members of the SSP Plus sample) includes 
a total of 5,685 persons — 2,858 in the treatment (SSP) group and 2,827 in the control (IA-only) 
group. We limit our analysis to persons with complete data on earnings, hours, and wages for 
months 1–54.
13 Our final estimation sample includes 3,875 persons — 1,991 in the SSP group 
and 1,884 in the IA-only group.
14,15 
                                                 
13 Based on personal communication with Douglas Tattrie of SRDC, we have realigned the transfer data so that the 
months are consistent across the different outcome measures. We have aligned transfers relative to the month when 
earnings were received.  We have replaced IA payments for a given month with those for the following month to 
reflect the fact that IA payments are issued for the preceding month’s earnings. Supplement payments generally   16
Our unit of observation is the person-month, with 54 months of data leading to a sample 
of 209,250. We choose to analyze the data at the person-month level because IA and SSP 
benefits are calculated monthly. We have also estimated models using averages over various 
time periods and the results are qualitatively similar to those presented here (some of these are 
discussed below in Section VII).
16 Treatment group members could begin getting the supplement 
as soon as they began working full-time and gave up IA, but they had only one year to establish 
eligibility for the supplement. They could receive at most 36 months of supplement payments 
after the month when they first established eligibility. Thus, we examine two time periods: 
months 1–48, the period during which persons assigned to the treatment group could have gotten 
the supplement; and months 49–54, after which all supplement payments should have ended. Our 
outcome measures include: monthly earnings, average monthly wages (averaged over multiple 
jobs), usual weekly hours (for that month), total monthly transfers (IA payments plus supplement 
payments if eligible), and total monthly income (earnings + total transfers).
17  
                                                                                                                                                             
correspond to the previous month's earnings or even at times to two months’ previous earnings. We adjust the 
supplement payments to be those of the following month if the first supplement payment was in the first month after 
the month of random assignment and those of the second month after this month (t+2) if the first supplement 
payment was the second month after random assignment or after. This adjusts for the fact that there was a delay 
between processing the pay stubs and issuing the SSP supplements. 
14 The first source for loss of observations is persons who do not complete the 54-month survey (833 observations). 
In addition, we also drop observations with a 54-month survey that have missing earnings or hours for any month in 
1–54 and several hundred cases where the 54 month interview occurred before the 54
th month after random 
assignment (together these result in 977 observations being dropped, of which 336 were interviewed before month 
54, 611 were missing an hours or earnings observation in months 1–54, and 30 were missing hours or earnings and 
were interviewed before month 54). 
15 We examine the selectivity of our sample selection in several ways. First, the IA and SSP payments are available 
for all observations for all months. Our estimates for total transfers and IA alone using the full sample are virtually 
identical to those reported here as are estimates for total transfers and IA alone estimated for only the sample in the 
54 month survey.  Further, the probability of an observation being dropped from the sample does not statistically 
differ between the treatment and control group. 
16 There are reasonable arguments in favor of using either person-months or person-level averages as the unit of 
analysis. In general, using person-months will increase the number of zero and outlying values, while using averages 
will reduce the incidence of zeros and outlying values. 
17 We have also estimated QTEs for the highest wage during a given month and total monthly hours.  The results 
were quite similar to those reported here for average wage and for weekly hours.  We settled on presenting QTEs for 
weekly hours because this made it easier for us to examine the SSP supplement eligibility threshold (30 hours a 
week), and because the monthly hours (like the monthly earnings) have been standardized to reflect the average 
number of weeks per month.   17
Tables 1 and 2 present pre-reform and post-reform mean differences between the 
treatment and control groups. Standard errors for these tables are calculated using simple T-tests. 
All other standard error calculations in the paper (including those for QTEs and mean differences 
across quantile in demographic characteristics) account for within-person statistical dependence 
using bootstrapping. Our bootstrap procedure uses nonoverlapping person-level blocks (i.e., we 
resample persons in an iid fashion and then use the full profiles of each resampled woman's 
outcomes). We use 500 nonparametric bootstrap replications and then calculate standard errors 
using the percentile method. Thus, the endpoints for the 90 per cent confidence intervals for a 
particular quantile are the smallest bootstrap estimate for that quantile less than or equal to the 5
th 
percentile of the bootstrap estimates for that quantile and the largest bootstrap estimate for that 
quantile that is greater than or equal to the 95
th percentile of the bootstrap estimates for that 
quantile.  
We begin by examining whether the treatment and control groups are well-balanced (as 
would be expected given random assignment). Table 1 presents means for a wide array of pre-
random assignment measures separately for the treatment and control groups. There are several 
things to note from Table 1. First, as would be expected from the random assignment process, 
the characteristics of the SSP group are very similar to the characteristics of the IA group. T-tests 
of the equality of means suggest that for a vast array of pre-random assignment measures 
(including many more variables than we present in the table), the treatment and control groups 
do not differ in a statistically significant sense. There are three exceptions: the IA group is 3.0 
percentage points less likely to have completed only high school (relative to high school dropout 
and some post-secondary) with a p-value of 0. 052; 2 percentage point more likely to be 
unemployed at baseline (p-value of 0.076); and the IA group received welfare for 0.6 fewer 
months out of the 36 preceding random assignment (p-value of 0.015). A joint test across the 16   18
pre-random assignment measures listed in Table 1 plus seven others denoting whether various 
measures are missing fails to reject equality of means (the χ
2(23)=29. 78, with a p-value of 
0.1559), suggesting that our sample is well balanced across the treatment and control groups.  
Table 1 also demonstrates that these women are relatively disadvantaged. About one-half 
of the group has never been married and half have not completed high school. About half of each 
group is of Canadian descent (not shown), another 10 per cent of each group is of First Nations 
ancestry, around 1–2 per cent of each sample is Black, and around 5 per cent are Asian (not 
shown). Not surprisingly, given that they were all on IA for 12 of the previous 13 months, only 
about 6 per cent were working full-time and 10–11 per cent were working part-time at random 
assignment. The groups were fairly evenly split across the two provinces; 52 per cent of the 
control group was in British Columbia at random assignment versus 53 per cent of the treatment 
group.  
  Table 2 presents mean impacts for the full sample and by province. We report means and 
treatment effects for months 1–48 and for months 49–54. The first four rows present average 
monthly values of earnings, weekly hours, average monthly wages, IA payments, total 
government payments (IA+SSP), and total income (earnings + total government transfers). (Note 
that earnings, hours, and wages are all 0 when the person is not working. This is not standard, 
especially for wages, but is the only available option if we want to avoid conditioning on 
working, which is obviously affected by random assignment.) The second and third panels 
present these same figures for British Columbia and New Brunswick.  
The table shows that during the supplement receipt period, SSP led to substantial, 
statistically significant increases in employment and earnings. For example, in months 1–48 
monthly earnings were, on average, $72 higher per month in the SSP group. Availability of SSP 
led to a reduction of $73 per month in IA benefits, but total government transfers were $58   19
higher for the SSP group. Overall, these results show that over the four years following random 
assignment, the impact of SSP on average total monthly income was $130 (an increase of about 
14 per cent compared to the estimated IA group baseline monthly income of $922). The last 
three columns echo the findings widely noted by others that the earnings and income differences 
decrease substantially (and are no longer significant in the case of income) after the end of the 
supplement availability period (during months 49–54). The earnings and transfers rows show 




rd panels show that the mean impacts are larger and longer lasting in New 
Brunswick compared to British Columbia. For example in the first 48 months, the mean 
treatment effect on earnings is $59 or 20 per cent of control group earnings in British Columbia 
compared to $85 or 36 per cent in New Brunswick. After the end of the SSP period, no 
significant effects remain in British Columbia while the mean earnings effect in New Brunswick 
remains a statistically significant $57. These differences echo the results in earlier research 
(Michalopoulos et al., 2002).
19 
 
VI. Quantile Treatment Effects 
Earnings QTEs 
Figures 2 and 3 introduce the QTE estimates. Figure 2 plots quantiles of the monthly 
earnings distribution using person-month observations for the SSP and IA groups for the SSP 
receipt period — the first 48 months following random assignment. (We also include horizontal 
lines for the means for the two groups for reference.) The solid line represents the SSP group and 
the dashed line represents the IA group. The vertical difference between the lines at a given 
                                                 
18 Note that IA does not quite equal total transfers for months 49–54, the period when, in theory, no one should 
obtain the supplement. However, our method for aligning the supplement payments with earnings (discussed in 
footnote 14) is not perfect, and a very small share of persons still report supplement payments in months 49–54 even 
after realigning transfers. 
19 Differences across provinces have also been found for family structure outcomes (Harknett & Gennetian, 2003).   20
quantile is an estimate of the SSP treatment effect on the earnings distribution at that quantile — 
the QTE. These QTEs are plotted in Figure 3. For comparison purposes, the mean treatment 
effect is plotted as a horizontal (dashed) line, and the 0-line is provided for reference. Dotted 
lines represent the bootstrapped two-sided 90 per cent confidence intervals.
20 The variation in the 
impact across the quantiles of the distributions is unmistakably significant, both statistically and 
substantively. This figure shows that for monthly earnings in the SSP receipt period, the QTEs 
are zero for about two-thirds of all person-months. This result occurs because monthly earnings 
are identically 0 for 65 per cent of person-months in the SSP group over the first 48 months and 
73 per cent of corresponding IA group person-months. For quantiles 66–94, SSP group earnings 
quantiles are greater than the control group earnings quantiles, yielding positive QTE estimates. 
For quantiles 96–99, IA group earnings quantiles exceed SSP group earnings quantiles, yielding 
negative (though insignificant) QTE estimates (the estimate for quantile 95 is zero).  
The range of the QTE point estimates is quite large, from -$165 to $470, compared to a 
mean treatment effect of $72. Under the null hypothesis of constant treatment effects, all QTE 
must be equal to the mean. As pointed out by Heckman et al., (1997) in the context of job-
training programs, this null can be rejected simply if a large share of the QTE are 0. We can also 
test whether a constant treatment effect could lead to a range as large as that for our QTE point 
estimate. We do this as follows, using the bootstrap. We take 250 observations of our bootstrap 
sample of the control group distribution and add the estimated mean treatment effect to them to 
create a synthetic null treatment group distribution. We use the other 250 observations of our 
control group distribution along with our synthetic null treatment group to construct QTE for the 
                                                 
20 Recall that the confidence intervals (CIs) are constructed by the percentile method, as the lowest bootstrapped 
quantile treatment effect estimate for the qth quantile at or below the 5
th percentile of the bootstrap distribution of 
quantile treatment effect estimates for that quantile q, and the highest bootstrap estimate for the qth quantile 
treatment effect at or above the 95
th percentile of the bootstrap quantile treatment effect distribution for quantile q.  
Since we do not assume normality for the standard errors, the CIs need not be (and frequently are not) symmetric 
around the QTE.   21
null hypothesis. We can then use the order statistics of the resulting individual distributions for 
each quantile to generate a confidence interval for testing various features of the null such as the 
maximum minus minimum range. Such a test compares the distribution for the maximum minus 
minimum range for the null with our real-data QTE maximum minus minimum range. This 
comparison suggests that a confidence interval for the null constant treatment range is [54,342] 
at a confidence level above 99 per cent, while the range estimated using the data is 634.  These 
results clearly show that the mean treatment effect is not sufficient to characterize SSP’s effects 
on earnings.  
These results are consistent with the predictions of labor supply theory, discussed above. 
That is, the QTEs at the low end are zero, they rise, and then they eventually become negative 
(although not statistically significantly so). To further explore the impacts of SSP on the 
distribution of earnings, we present QTEs for usual weekly hours (Figure 4) and average wages 
(Figure 5). The wage measure is an average across all jobs in a given month and zero if the 
recipient is not working. The structure of the figures is identical to Figure 3 — we present the 
mean treatment effect, the QTEs and the 90 per cent confidence interval of the QTEs. Both 
Figures 4 and 5 refer to the SSP receipt period — months 1–48.  
Like the QTEs for earnings, the QTEs for hours and wages are zero through the 65
th 
quantile, reflecting the fact that for 65 per cent of person-months in the SSP group, the recipients 
are not working and earnings are zero.
21 For quantiles 66–91, the QTEs for hours are positive 
and then the QTEs fall to essentially zero for the top 8 quantiles.  This finding is consistent with 
the “SSP windfall” group having little hours response.  It does not suggest a negative hours 
response among the behaviorally eligible group. 
                                                 
21 Remember the sample includes nonworkers and workers.  We have set wages to zero for nonworkers.   22
Why might we not see a decline in hours quantiles in the top of the hours distribution?  
First, SSP requires full time work, so hours cannot fall below 30 hours per week. There is strong 
evidence of a behavioral response to the full-time requirement — 4.7 per cent of persons in the 
SSP group have exactly 30 hours per week compared to 1.9 per cent in the IA-only group (and 
the difference is significant at the 1 per cent level). Second, IA is a relatively generous program 
— recall that the breakeven earnings point in IA is on the order of $747 (NB) to $1146 (BC) per 
month for a single mother with one child. Only 12 per cent of the control group in BC and 14 per 
cent of the control group in NB has earnings in months 1–54 that exceed the IA breakeven point 
(this is an upper bound for the share of women we expect to reduce their hours either to become 
behaviorally eligible or because they are mechanically eligible).  Thirdly, SSP itself is even more 
generous than IA. Thus the share of women who would counterfactually be above the SSP 
breakeven point but could reduce their hours of work to become eligible for SSP is even smaller.  
Only 4.6 per cent of the control group in BC and 3.2 per cent of the control group in NB ever has 
earnings in months 1–54 that exceed the benchmark at the time of random assignment (lose SSP 
eligibility) and only 1.0 per cent of the BC control group and 0.6 per cent of the NB control 
group exceed the benchmark on average during months 1–54.
22 
By contrast, the QTE estimates for average wages (Figure 5) are negative for the top 9 
quantiles, though they are also very imprecisely estimated. Thus the evidence is more consistent 
with the theory that SSP led to a reduction in the wage distribution at the top of the wage 
distribution than the theory that SSP led to a reduction in the hours distribution at the top of the 
hours distribution. It is also consistent with the reductions in wages being concentrated at the top 
of the wage distribution, where there is scope to reduce wages and not be below the minimum 
wage. Like Card & Hyslop (2004), we find that the minimum wage is quite important for this 
                                                 
22 This is quite different from the experiment in Bitler et al., (Forthcoming) where a large fraction of the control 
group had earnings at or above the “windfall” range and there was no full-time work requirement.  In that case, we 
argued that there was substantial scope for a reduction in labor supply to maintain eligibility for welfare.    23
group — 4.9 per cent of the SSP group and 3.0 per cent of the IA-only group have average 
wages equal to the minimum wage during months 1–54.  The numbers for workers are more 
striking, 14.2 per cent of SSP workers and 10.8 per cent of IA-only workers were at the 
minimum wage during months 1–54.  
Figure 6 plots the earnings QTE results in months 49–54, after the three-year SSP receipt 
period is over for all women. The earnings effects clearly diminish after the completion of the 
SSP period. However, the basic pattern is still evident: zero impacts at the bottom, (modest) 
increases in earnings in the middle of the earnings distribution, and reductions in earnings at the 
top of the earnings distribution.  
Transfers QTEs   
Figure 7 presents results for total government transfers (IA + SSP) in the first 48 months. 
There are several observations to make from this figure. First, the QTEs are everywhere 
nonnegative, which reflects the generous nature of the SSP subsidy. Second, the results show 
that the impact of SSP on the distribution of transfers is very concentrated. In particular, the 
QTEs are identically 0 for the bottom 18 quantiles, reflecting the fact that for 18 per cent of 
person-months, both the treatment and control group have zero transfer income. Between 
quantiles 19 and 36, the QTE estimates range from $64 to $422 per month. Many of these 
impacts are quite large compared to the control group mean level of $659 per month. The 
confidence interval for a null of constant treatment effects is [25, 257] at a confidence level of 
above 99 per cent, while the estimated range over all quantiles in the real data is 423.  For 
quantiles 37–91, the QTE estimates are relatively small and below the mean treatment effect of 
$58. This figure provides substantial insight into SSP’s effects beyond that afforded by mean 
treatment effects. Furthermore, the pattern of the QTE estimates is consistent with theoretical 
predictions. For transfers, the zero-to-small effects in the top two thirds of the transfer   24
distribution is likely to correspond to the bottom of the earnings distribution (where earlier we 
saw that SSP led to no change in the earnings distribution).  
We have also estimated QTEs for IA payments alone (Appendix Figures 1 and 2). Those 
graphs present a very similar story which is not surprising since anyone getting the supplement 
must forego IA. The QTEs for IA payments are everywhere nonpositive, and the effects are 
concentrated in the second quartile of the IA distribution.  
  Figure 8 shows that the QTEs for total government transfers during months 49–54 (after 
SSP payments have ended) are much different. The mean treatment effect shows a small 
decrease in mean transfers (-$33) in this period. For the lowest 39 quantiles, the QTE estimates 
are zero as are all these quantiles for both the SSP distribution and the IA-only distribution. At 
quantiles 59 and above, the QTE are close to zero, ranging from -$30 to $8. But for quantiles 40–
58, the QTE are negative and sometimes sizable, showing a reduction in the transfer distribution 
associated with SSP. This last finding is consistent with the results in Figure 6, which imply 
some positive impacts on labor supply even after SSP ends.  
Total Income QTEs 
  Figure 9 plots the QTE results for total income in months 1–48. These results again 
suggest a large degree of heterogeneity in the impact of SSP on the distribution of income. The 
QTEs range from $0 for the bottom 9 quantiles — where total income is $0 for both groups — to 
a maximum of $495. The mean treatment effect for this period is $130, so again the range of 
quantile treatment effects is large compared to the mean treatment effect. The confidence interval 
for a null of constant treatment effects is [48, 467] at a confidence level of above 99 per cent, 
while the estimated range in the real data is 495. Throughout most of the bottom two thirds of the 
distribution, the QTEs are relatively small and are below the mean treatment effect. Beginning at 
quantile 66, however, the QTE estimates suggest that SSP leads to a large increase in income in   25
the upper third of the income distribution (increase above the mean treatment effect). These 
gains can be compared to the baseline mean for the IA group of $922. This pattern suggests that 
a generous, work-oriented income supplement can lead to increases in the income distribution — 
but that most of the gains may be concentrated at the upper ranges of the income distribution.
23 
Thus, at least while the supplement was available, it may have led to increased inequality within 
this group of long-term welfare recipients. 
  It would be useful to decompose the QTE estimates for income into the impacts on 
earnings and transfers. But there need not be any particular relationship between QTE for total 
income and changes in its components, since non-zero points in the income distribution could 
potentially correspond to any of a variety of non-zero points in the earnings and transfer 
distributions. However, we can try to describe how the components of total income differ across 
program assignment at different points in each income distribution.  
To do so, we use local nonparametric regression techniques to estimate treatment-control 
differences in earnings and transfers for each quantile of the income distribution.
24 We plot these 
differences by quantile for months 1–48 in Figure 10. The results show very small differences up 
to about the 77th quantile, where positive total income QTE are associated with greater transfer 
payments among treated women than among those in the control group. Over the next 14 
quantiles, the average difference in earnings is positive and generally increasing, while the 
average difference in transfers is negative. The most striking thing about the figure, however, is 
that at the top of the income distribution the difference in transfers is positive and large while the 
                                                 
23 Given the program design and the fact that income- and otherwise-eligible recipients in the supplement group 
could qualify for Income Assistance if they were not receiving the supplement, it may not be surprising that no one 
appears to be worse off income-wise (at least not while the supplement is available). 
24 In particular, we use locally weighted regression (LOWESS) techniques to regress earnings (and transfers) on 
total income at each quantile q of the total income distribution separately for the SSP and IA-only groups. We then 
construct means for the average treatment and control differences in earnings and transfers (from the LOWESS 
estimates) at each income quantile by taking the difference between the estimates in the SSP and IA-only 
regressions. Estimates are constructed similarly for transfers.     26
difference in earnings is negative and large. These effects are consistent with the interpretation 
that the positive QTE estimates at the top of the income distribution are associated with a 
combination of greater transfers and lesser earnings. We emphasize that these differences cannot 
generally be interpreted as causal, since the total income quantile is not assigned experimentally. 
In addition, an important drawback to this procedure is that computing average earnings at a 
given total income quantile implicitly requires varying transfer payments negatively (since 
transfers plus earnings are held locally fixed in such a regression).  
   Figure 11 plots the QTE results for the post-SSP time period, months 49–54. Here, the 
impacts across the distribution are quite homogeneous, showing no change or very small changes 
in the income distribution after SSP payments cease. Here the mean treatment effect of -$1 
provides a fairly complete picture of the impacts during months 49–54 over almost the entire 
range (with the very top of the distribution being the only real exception).  
QTEs by Province 
  Our results in Table 2 (above) show that the mean impacts are larger and longer lasting in 
New Brunswick compared to British Columbia. Here we extend that finding by comparing QTE 
for the NB and BC samples. Figure 12 presents the QTE for earnings in months 1–48. To 
facilitate ready comparison, we plot both the QTE for the NB sample (solid line, peaks to the 
left) and the BC sample (dashed line, peaks to the right) on the same figure. For readability, we 
omit the mean impacts from the figure. Figure 13 plots the difference in the QTE between the 
two provinces, along with the 90 per cent confidence interval for this estimate.  
  These figures show that the overall pattern of the impact of SSP on the distribution of 
earnings in months 1–48 is very similar — the QTEs are zero at the bottom of the distribution, 
positive in the upper part of the distribution with negative or zero QTEs at the very highest 
quantiles of the earnings distribution. There are qualitative differences, however. The NB sample   27
has positive QTEs in a larger range of the sample and the largest QTEs are somewhat larger in 
the BC sample. Figure 13 shows that few of the pairwise differences are statistically significantly 
different, however.  
These differences may reflect differences in the incentives in the two provinces. The 
guarantee in the IA program is much higher in BC compared to NB. The SSP benchmark, 
however, was also a more generous $37,000 in BC relative to $30,000 in NB. Further, the 
minimum wage was $5.50 at the beginning of the experiment in British Columbia but $5.00 in 
New Brunswick. In addition, the demographic composition of the welfare population differs in 
the two provinces. Sample members from British Columbia were more likely to have been born 
abroad and to have completed some post-secondary education. Women selected in New 
Brunswick were likely to have had longer welfare spells. One would expect earnings QTEs to be 
positive first for New Brunswick simply because the minimum wage there is lower, so the lowest 
earnings level at which one could obtain the supplement is lower.  
The QTE results for total income for the two provinces in months 1–48 are presented in 
Figure 14 (with the difference in the QTE in Figure 15). Again, the QTE for BC and NB look 
similar: zero at the very bottom, then positive, then close to zero again, then rising at the top and 
peaking around the 80
th quantile. However, the positive QTEs at the bottom for BC are 
concentrated in a tight band near the 10
th quantile, while those for NB are much broader, ranging 
from about the 10
th to about the 25
th quantile. At the same time, only the lower peak for BC rises 
above the mean impact (not shown on the figure).  
Notably, Figures 12 and 14 show that the variation in the QTEs within province 
outweighs that between provinces. This result shows that differences in unobservables can be 
large compared to observable differences like the demographic, economic, and programmatic 
differences between NB and BC.    28
  The mean impacts for earnings in post-SSP period (reported in Table 2 and documented 
more completely in Michalopoulos et al., 2002) suggest that earnings impacts were longer-
lasting in NB. However, earnings QTE for months 49–54 (not shown here) show a more nuanced 
story: while BC does exhibit a larger range of zero QTEs compared to NB, we find that both 
provinces show positive earnings impacts for a substantial portion of the distribution. The total 
income QTEs in the post-SSP period (not shown here) are qualitatively similar for the two 
provinces.  
 
VII. Evidence on Rank Preservation and Rank Reversal 
  The QTE results provide important evidence that the impact of SSP varied across the 
distribution of earnings, transfers, and income. As discussed above, the impact of the treatment 
on the distribution is distinct from and generally not equal to the distribution of treatment effects. 
If a person’s rank in the distribution does not change with the treatment (known as rank 
preservation), however, then the impact of the treatment on the distribution would be equivalent 
to the distribution of treatment effects. While we cannot test for rank preservation, we can use 
the treatment and control distributions of demographic characteristics to see if there is indeed 
evidence of rank reversal. For example, if the distribution of observable characteristics in some 
range of the earnings distribution varies significantly between the treatment and control group, 
this would be evidence against rank preservation. Unfortunately, this sort of test can provide only 
negative evidence: finding no significant differences in demographics does not imply rank 
preservation. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to test for evidence of rank reversal 
in this fashion. 
In particular, we estimate QTEs for person averages of earnings, transfers, and income 
for months 1–48. These are presented in Appendix Figures 3, 4, and 5, respectively. Note first   29
that the QTEs for the averages are more spread out than the QTEs for the person-months, as one 
would expect. Also notice that the patterns are qualitatively quite similar to the person-month 
estimates. We take the 25
th, 50
th, and 75
th cutoffs for the distributions of earnings, transfers and 
incomes for the treatment and control groups, and calculate mean treatment and control group 
values for the various demographics within the following ranges: less than or equal to the 25
th 
percentile, greater than the 25
th percentile but less than or equal to the 50
th percentile, greater 
than the 50
th percentile but less than or equal to the 75
th percentile, and greater than the 75th 
percentile. Since the distributions of average earnings are only positive slightly below the 50
th 
percentile, we only calculate the tests for the 0–50
th, 50
th–75
th, and above the 75
th percentiles for 
earnings. Note that we could calculate similar statistics for the person-month estimates, but find 
it more transparent to use average QTEs for this purpose, because then each person only falls 
within a single range. For example, one estimate of the differences is the fraction white among 
treatment group members in the 25
th–50
th percentiles of the SSP group’s income distribution, 
minus the fraction white among control group members within the analogous range.  
We follow Abadie (2002) in using the bootstrap to estimate the null distribution for these 
differences; our full bootstrap procedure is as follows: 
1.  Sampling with replacement from the actual data, draw 500 bootstrap samples, 
each  having the same number of observations as the real data. Index these 
samples with b ∈ {1,2,…,500}.  
2.  For the bth replication sample, do the following: 
a.  Randomly order the observations in the bootstrap sample.  
b.  Assign the first 1,991 to a synthetic “treatment” group, and assign the rest 
to a synthetic “control” group (there are 1,991 treated observations in the 
actual data).    30
c.  For each mean in which we are interested (for example, the fraction white 
in the first 25 quantiles of the transfer distribution), calculate its value in 
the synthetic program groups, and then take the difference of these sample 
means. Call this difference db.  
3.  Sort all elements of the set {db}, b={1,2,…,500} from lowest to highest.  
4.  Use d25 and d475, respectively, as estimates of the 5
th and 95
th percentiles of the 
null sampling distribution of our statistic d; a 90 per cent confidence interval is 
then constructed as C=[d25, d475].  
A real-data estimated difference is significantly different from zero if it falls outside the 
interval C just defined. More generally, following Cameron & Trivedi (2005) we can calculate 
the p-value for any statistic as follows.  Create a vector of values for the statistic, including the 
real data realization, with the other 500 values being the realizations of the statistic from the 500 
bootstrap draws that impose the null. Take the absolute value of the statistic, and sort these 
values. Let k be the index of the real data observation in the sorted data. (For example, if the real 
data estimate in the sorted data lies between the 431
st and 432
nd bootstrap realization, then k = 
432.) Then, our p-value is p = 1- (k-1)/501. 
  In Table 3, we present the results for 12 demographic variables for gender, race, ancestry, 
language, and education. There are three panels in the table; each classifies people by their 
position (quantile) in the distribution. The top panel uses the earnings distribution, the middle 
panel uses the transfer distribution, and the bottom panel uses the total income distribution.
25  
Each column presents the difference in the demographic variable between the two samples 
within a given quartile along with their p-value for statistical significance. Of the 132 differences 
here, 26 are statistically significant at the 10 per cent level or below and 16 are significant at the 
                                                 
25 There are three columns in the top panel and four columns in the middle and bottom panels.  This reflects the fact 
(noted above) that a larger fraction of each average earnings distribution is 0, requiring us to collapse the first and 
second quartiles into one group in that case.   31
5 per cent level or below. This certainly suggests some evidence of rank reversal based on these 
demographic characteristics. Because we are considering multiple differences in means, simply 
counting the number of rejections in these individual tests is an inadequate test: each test could 
have relatively low power, a problem that can be solved with a joint test for the significance of 
the twelve demographic variables in each quantile range.
26   
When we do joint tests for earnings, transfers, and total income over the entire period, we 
find that we reject the joint test for earnings in the range  75 50 ≤ < q  (p-value of 0.005), for 
transfers in the range  25 0 ≤ < q (p-value of 0.009), and for total income in the ranges 
25 0 ≤ < q (p-value of 0.028) and  75 > q  (p-value of 0.004). We fail to reject for the other 7 
ranges for earnings, transfers, and total income. We also fail to reject in any ranges for IA 
payments, highest monthly wage, average monthly wage, usual weekly hours, and total monthly 
hours (not shown in table). While the individual tests suggest some rank reversal may be present, 
the joint test results convincingly demonstrate that even at the very coarse level on which our 
demographics test operates, strict rank preservation is rejected. More work — both theoretical 
and empirical — would be needed to go further in discussing the degree of rank reversal, and this 
issue is beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, we firmly 
believe that QTE methodology is informative for evaluating programs like SSP. 
                                                 
26 To test for the joint significance of these differences within a given quantile range, we will use a simple chi-square 
test. Let the column vector of sample differences in means for the demographic characteristics bed . Each difference 
of means is asymptotically normal. Thus,  ) ( d d n − is distributed N(0,V), where V is the covariance matrix for the 
random variable d . Under the null hypothesis that the true vector of differences d equals zero, the statistic  d V d 1 − ′  
will have a chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the dimension of d , the vector of differences. 
The practical challenge is to estimate the covariance matrix; we use our realized bootstrap distribution to do so.  
Letting db be the realization of our vector of differences for the bth bootstrap sample, we estimate this matrix with 
the estimator ' * 500
1
* * ) ( * ) ( 500
1 d d d d V b
b
b − − = ∑
=





1 b d d is the bootstrap-sample average of 
realized differences in means. We then refer our chi-square statistics  d V d 1 − ′  to a table of Chi-square critical 
values.   32
It is important to note, however, that this test is rather weak in two respects. First, for 
computational ease, we have grouped many quantiles together, and we may have missed 
differences in demographics within our groupings. Second, even if demographics do not change, 
rank reversals may have occurred among unobservables, such as preferences for work and fixed 
costs of work, for example, that are not fully reflected in observables.  
Since we have found evidence of rank reversal, it suggests that our QTE estimates are 
informative about the overall impacts of the program but cannot be used to determine impacts for 
individuals at specific points in the distribution. Social welfare analysis, of course, makes use of 
the marginal distributions shown in our QTE. Furthermore, our previous results clearly suggest 
heterogeneity in the impacts of SSP even if we cannot determine exactly who is impacted by it. 
 
VIII. Conclusions  
During the 1990s, a number of governments experimented with changes to their means-
tested cash assistance programs to encourage work among low-income women. In this paper, we 
investigate the impact of a unique experiment—the Canadian Self-Sufficiency Project (SSP). 
SSP coupled a strict work requirement (full-time work at the minimum wage) with a generous 
earnings subsidy for a period of up to 3 years for long-term Income Assistance (IA) recipients as 
an alternative to simply receiving Income Assistance (IA).  
Adding to the substantial literature on SSP, we examine the impacts of SSP on the 
distribution of earnings, transfers (IA plus the SSP supplement), and income for long term IA 
recipients using quantile treatment effects (QTEs).  While mean impact analysis allows one to 
calculate costs and benefits of new policies, examining impacts on the entire distribution has the 
potential to uncover effects that may vary systematically across the distribution.  For example, 
we examine whether the benefits of SSP are spread across the distribution or concentrated in   33
particular parts of the distribution. Knowledge of such heterogeneity may be important to 
policymakers, particularly in the context of programs aimed at poverty alleviation.  
Our findings lead to several conclusions. First, we find quite heterogeneous impacts 
across the various distributions — QTEs for earnings, transfers, and income all show 
considerable variability that would be missed if we focused on simple mean treatment effects. 
Moreover, these varied impacts are consistent with predictions of labor supply theory. For 
example, during the period when the subsidy is available, the impact of SSP on the earnings 
distribution is zero for the bottom half of the distribution. The SSP earnings distribution is higher 
than the control group for much of the upper third of the distribution except at the very top, 
where the earnings distribution is the same under either program or possibly lower under SSP. 
Further, during the SSP receipt period, positive impacts on the transfer distribution are 
concentrated at the lower end of the transfer distribution while positive impacts on the income 
distribution are concentrated in the upper end of the income distribution. Impacts of SSP on these 
distributions were essentially zero after the subsidy was no longer available. Variation in impacts 
within province is much larger than variation between provinces.    34
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Notes: Figure depicts stylized budget constraint for IA and SSP, assuming that the wage is such that a recipient’s 
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Figure 1: Stylized Budget Constraint for IA and SSP 
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Notes: Solid lines refer to the treatment (SSP/IA) group and dashed lines refer to the control (IA-only) group.  
Horizontal lines are means and the other lines are quantiles of the distribution of earnings. 

























Notes: In each figure, the solid lines are QTEs, dotted lines are bootstrapped 90% confidence intervals (accounting 
for within person dependence), and dashed lines are mean treatment effects. 
Figure 3: SSP Quantile Treatment Effects on Distribution of Monthly Earnings,
























Figure 4: SSP Quantile Treatment Effects on Distribution of Weekly Hours,



























Notes: In each figure, the solid lines are QTEs, dotted lines are bootstrapped 90% confidence intervals (accounting 
for within person dependence), and dashed lines are mean treatment effects.
Figure 6: SSP Quantile Treatment Effects on Distribution of Monthly Earnings, 
























Figure 5: SSP Quantile Treatment Effects on Distribution of Average 


























Notes: In each figure, the solid lines are QTEs, dotted lines are bootstrapped 90% confidence intervals (accounting 
for within person dependence), and dashed lines are mean treatment effects. Transfers include IA and SSP payments 
(if eligible). 
Figure 7: SSP Quantile Treatment Effects on Distribution of Transfers (IA + SSP)
























Figure 8:  SSP Quantile Treatment Effects on Distribution of Transfers (IA + SSP)
























Notes: The solid line shows the QTEs, dotted lines are bootstrapped 90% confidence intervals (accounting for within 
person dependence), and dashed line shows the mean treatment effect.  Total income includes earnings and 
government transfers (IA+SSP if eligible). 
Notes: Solid line refers to the difference in transfers between the treatment and control groups and dashed line refers 
to the differences in earnings between the treatment and control groups. Differences at each quantile calculated by 
local regression (LOWESS). See text for details.  
Figure 9:  SSP Quantile Treatment Effects on Distribution of Total Income 
























Figure 10: Local Nonparametric Estimates Treatment-Control Differences










































Notes: The solid line shows QTEs, dotted lines are bootstrapped 90% confidence intervals (accounting for within 
person dependence), and dashed line shows the mean treatment effect. Total income includes earnings and 
government transfers (IA+SSP if eligible). 
Figure 11:  SSP Quantile Treatment Effects on the Distribution of Total Income












































Notes: The solid line (peaks first, on the left) shows the QTEs for New Brunswick, the heavy dashed line (peaks 
second, on the right) shows the QTEs for British Columbia, and dotted lines are bootstrapped 90% confidence 
intervals (accounting for within person dependence). 
 
 
Notes: The solid line shows the difference in QTEs (the QTEs for British Columbia minus the QTEs for New 
Brunswick) and the dotted lines are bootstrapped 90% confidence intervals for this difference (accounting for 
within-person dependence).   





































Figure 12: SSP Quantile Treatment Effects on the Distribution of 



















































Notes: The solid line shows the QTE for New Brunswick (peaks second on the left and first on the right), the heavy 
dashed line shows the QTEs for British Columbia (peaks first on the left, and second on the right), and dotted lines 
are bootstrapped 90% confidence intervals (accounting for within person dependence). 
 
Notes: The solid line shows the difference in QTEs (the QTEs for British Columbia minus the QTEs for New 
Brunswick) and the dotted lines are bootstrapped 90% confidence intervals for this difference (accounting for 
within-person dependence).   







































Figure 14: SSP Quantile Treatment Effects on the Distribution of

























British Columbia  46
Table 1: Characteristics of SSP Recipient Sample 
 
  
Means by group 
 
 Treatment Control  Difference
Female Recipient  0.959 0.968  -0.009 
Age 31.7 31.6  0.104 
Divorced or Separated  0.477 0.473  0.004 
Never-Married 0.485 0.481  0.004 
First Nations  0.097 0.098  -0.001 
Born Abroad  0.136 0.140  -0.005 
Speaks French  0.125 0.128  -0.003 
# Children under 19 in Case  1.629 1.668  -0.039 
High School Dropout  0.541 0.562  -0.022 
Completed Only High School  0.363 0.333  0.030* 
British Columbia  0.528 0.525  0.003 
Currently in School  0.146 0.136  0.009 
Working Full-Time at Baseline  0.056 0.058  -0.002 
Working Part-Time at Baseline  0.114 0.105  0.009 
Unemployed at Baseline  0.212 0.236  -0.024* 
Months on IA in 36 Months Pre-RA  30.2 29.6  0.613** 
  
Number of Observations  1,991 1,884   
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, 
and 10 per cent levels, respectively. Baseline data on a small number of observations for some variables are missing 
(and have been set to zero). Data are for 1,991 recipients assigned to SSP and 1,884 recipients assigned to IA. 
Rounding done independently and thus may cause slight discrepancies in sums and differences.   47
Table 2: Outcomes and Mean Impacts in SSP Recipient Sample 
 Months  1–48 Months  49–54 
  SSP Mean  IA Mean  Difference  SSP Mean  IA Mean  Difference 









































































N 95,568  90,432    11,946  11,304   









































































N 50,448  47,472    6,306  5,934   









































































N 45,120  42,960    5,640  5,370   
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, 
and 10 per cent levels, respectively (only for differences). Data are for 1,991 recipients assigned to SSP and 1,884 
recipients assigned to IA. Rounding done independently and thus may cause slight discrepancies in sums and 
differences.   48
Table 3: Tests of Rank Reversal from Distribution of Observables for Ranges in Earnings, Transfers and Income 
Distributions 









p-value    
Female  -0.009 0.353 0.002 0.866  -0.019 0.098     
Age  -0.132 0.743 0.296 0.557 0.400 0.425     
Employed Full Time  -0.001  0.735  0.040  0.004  -0.046  0.066     
Asian  Ancestry  -0.009 0.485 0.009 0.327 0.007 0.469     
Canadian  Ancestry  0.024 0.305  -0.046 0.136 0.016 0.613     
Black  Ancestry  -0.002 0.731  -0.009 0.244  -0.005 0.567     
First  Nations  Ancestry  -0.009 0.523 0.034 0.060  -0.020 0.232     
European  Descent  -0.013 0.595  -0.039 0.188 0.026 0.405     
French  Speaking  0.004 0.800  -0.039 0.126 0.019 0.393     
English  Speaking  -0.012 0.259  -0.004 0.521 0.003 0.703     
High  School  Dropout  -0.034 0.136  -0.076 0.022 0.055 0.076     
High School Graduate, No 
College  0.042 0.040 0.043 0.186  -0.008 0.818 
  












Female  -0.021 0.082  -0.004 0.754 0.000 0.996  -0.011 0.345 
Age  -0.098 0.850 0.374 0.527  -0.359 0.497 0.502 0.323 
Employed  Full  Time  -0.067 0.004 0.026 0.092 0.017 0.074 0.016 0.096 
Asian  Ancestry  0.003 0.802 0.005 0.553  -0.010 0.355 0.001 0.946 
Canadian  Ancestry  0.005 0.900 0.045 0.150  -0.020 0.557  -0.011 0.752 
Black  Ancestry  -0.009 0.285  -0.003 0.735 0.003 0.685  -0.009 0.277 
First  Nations  Ancestry  0.045 0.012  -0.017 0.325  -0.009 0.641  -0.022 0.277 
European  Descent  0.023 0.461  -0.058 0.034 0.015 0.649  -0.019 0.609 
French  Speaking  0.019 0.475  -0.009 0.719  -0.004 0.866  -0.016 0.172 
English  Speaking  -0.007 0.385 0.003 0.717  -0.007 0.469  -0.016 0.385 
High  School  Dropout  0.027 0.381 0.003 0.928  -0.048 0.126  -0.068 0.032 
High School Graduate, No 
College  -0.010 0.762 0.003 0.938 0.041 0.156 0.086 0.006 
q≤25 25<q≤50 50<q≤75  q>75   











Female  -0.028 0.032 0.006 0.609  -0.004 0.731  -0.009 0.403 
Age  0.675 0.287  -0.254 0.657  -0.453 0.371 0.443 0.359 
Employed  Full  Time  -0.030 0.008  -0.001 0.906 0.012 0.417 0.014 0.503 
Asian  Ancestry  0.009 0.393  -0.002 0.890 0.020 0.313  -0.028 0.104 
Canadian  Ancestry  -0.022 0.525  -0.005 0.890  -0.025 0.453 0.073 0.034 
Black  Ancestry  0.003 0.631  -0.001 0.890  -0.011 0.130  -0.010 0.275 
First  Nations  Ancestry  0.039 0.032  -0.007 0.701 0.014 0.473  -0.049 0.012 
European  Descent  -0.018 0.559  -0.051 0.090  -0.024 0.443 0.050 0.116 
French  Speaking  -0.025 0.331  -0.021 0.393  -0.008 0.575 0.044 0.020 
English  Speaking  -0.015 0.132  -0.007 0.479  -0.024 0.148 0.020 0.076 
High  School  Dropout  0.021 0.507  -0.020 0.587 0.002 0.922  -0.092 0.006 
High School Graduate, No 
College  -0.019 0.585 0.034 0.263 0.027 0.361 0.078 0.018 
Notes: Mean treatment-control differences and p-values for tests of individual differences being significant. Null 
distribution derived using method of Abadie (2002). See text for more information.  49
 
Notes: In each figure, the solid lines are QTEs, dotted lines are bootstrapped 90% confidence intervals (accounting 
for within person dependence), and dashed lines are mean treatment effects. 

















































Notes: In each figure, the solid lines are QTEs, dotted lines are bootstrapped 90% confidence intervals (accounting 
for within person dependence), and dashed lines are mean treatment effects.  Sample consists of one observation per 
person with averages over monthly amounts for months 1-48.
Appendix Figure 3: QTE on the Distribution of Average Monthly Earnings, 
































Appendix Figure 4: QTE on the Distribution of Average Monthly Transfers,


































Notes: The solid line is the QTE, dotted lines are bootstrapped 90% confidence intervals (accounting for within 
person dependence), and dashed line is the mean treatment effect.  Sample consists of one observation per person 
with averaged monthly income over months 1-48 
 
Appendix Figure 5: QTE on the Distribution of Average Monthly Income,
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